Making Democracy Deliver

In many contemporary cases, democracies no longer collapse through military interventions or sudden executive seizures of power, as was often the case during the Cold War. Instead, they are hollowed out from within by leaders who come to power through free and competitive elections, only to capture the state apparatus and use partisan bureaucracy and the judiciary to weaken the opposition and entrench themselves in power. Indeed, elections continue to be organized regularly in most countries, but often on an uneven and unfair playing field. This is the central paradox of democratic erosion in the contemporary period: Democratic regimes tend to be undermined not by losers, but rather by winners who convert electoral victories into institutional domination. Citizens have not lost interest in democracy, but many no longer believe democratic institutions can respond to their demands and grievances. Therefore, elections remain popular among the electorate, even though many voters support leaders with autocratic tendencies and do not rally to defend other democratic institutions.

A combination of unresponsive political institutions and growing economic anxieties create structural conditions conducive to democratic erosion in these contexts. By unresponsiveness, I refer to the growing inability of political actors and institutions to address social grievances with effective policy responses. Citizens lose faith in mainstream political actors when elected governments appear unable to deliver basic security, services, housing, and economic stability. When institutions are unresponsive to the needs of a growing number of citizens, those citizens feel disaffected and excluded from the political arena and are drawn to anti-establishment politicians. Popular concerns over migration, free trade, the costs of distant wars, the recognition of cultural rights for religious and ethnic groups, and economic insecurity have all surfaced in different national contexts to fuel populist challenges. Especially during moments of political and economic crises, disaffected voters become drawn to populist parties, more receptive to polarizing campaigns, and less willing to support democratic institutions. Populists succeed by transforming such grievances into a moralized conflict between “the people” and allegedly corrupt elites, portraying their political opponents as out of touch with popular sentiments.

The consequences of this unresponsiveness are especially visible among younger citizens. Due to the climate crisis, economic pressures, and declining opportunities, young citizens have emerged as a major anti-establishment force in both the industrialized West and the Global South. Gen Z voters played an important role in lifting anti-establishment and reform candidates to political prominence from New York City to Budapest and Istanbul, and they also fueled anti-government mobilizations in Nepal and Bangladesh under very different regime conditions. Yet democratic resilience debates do not adequately explore the issues that motivate them, the platforms through which they organize, or the digital venues they inhabit. Young people are not just another constituency to be mobilized during electoral campaigns; they can become a major democratizing force in society. If pro-democracy actors fail to engage them with a credible program and opportunities, however, they may become susceptible to radical political options or drift into political apathy or violence.

The crisis of responsiveness is no longer purely domestic. Geopolitical and economic shocks now travel quickly across borders, raising prices, intensifying insecurity, and giving political leaders new opportunities to undermine democratic competition. In particular, rising energy and fertilizer prices following the ongoing conflict in Iran severely hit national economies, especially in Asia and Europe, creating inflationary pressures on the wider global markets and further deepening social discontent and economic anxiety. Until recently, domestic factors largely determined how elections in backsliding regimes would unfold, even when incumbents tilted the playing field in their favor. That is no longer the case. Outside actors are also more willing and able to shape domestic political competition across borders. Influence operations were detected in the 2016 presidential elections in the United States and 2024 Romanian presidential elections, while the Trump administration has blurred the boundary between diplomacy and partisan intervention by openly supporting his allies such as Javier Milei in Argentina and Viktor Orbán in Hungary, while signaling sympathy for far-right challengers in Europe.

These external pressures make strategic adaptation by pro-democracy movements even more important. In electoral authoritarian regimes, where elections occur regularly but the playing field is tilted against the opposition, coordination among opposition parties is crucial for electoral victory and peaceful government turnover. But coordination cannot be reduced to a formal alliance agreement.  As seen in the 2022 Hungarian and 2023 Turkish general elections, opposition parties that formally unite under a pre-electoral alliance may nonetheless end up running a very ineffective campaign due to poor coordination, organizational divisions, and disputes over candidate selection. The implication of such cases is that formal coalition agreements are not sufficient for defeating authoritarian incumbents. What distinguishes successful cases such as Malaysia in 2018 and Poland in 2023 is not only unity, but also a credible opposition leader, a flexible coalition arrangement, and a governing formula that offers all stakeholders some payoff from victory.

Pro-democracy parties cannot meet this growing challenge by simply denouncing populists as morally illegitimate and preserving the status quo. This is a self-defeating course in the long run, as populist politicians would increase their electoral strength by criticizing the shortcomings of the status quo. Instead, pro-democracy parties should respond to the issues driving voters toward them by offering clear policy solutions and a workable alternative. Rebuilding trust and engagement in democratic institutions requires more than procedural appeals. Democracies do not always offer simple and quick solutions to the complex problems we currently face. However, when run effectively, democratic institutions are better at responding to citizens’ demands and representing their views, grievances, and identities.

Trust can be rebuilt only if democratic politics becomes more inclusive and responsive to popular concerns. This can happen through new movements or parties that address those concerns such as Hungary’s TISZA Party, through local politicians who run on an agenda of reform and change such as Mamdani in New York City, Andy Burnham in Manchester, and İmamoğlu in Istanbul, or through leadership changes within mainstream parties that shift their agendas. In particular, local governments can serve as an alternative platform for pro-democracy parties against populist incumbents and far-right challengers. Pro-democracy mayors now govern major metropolitan areas in backsliding democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes, while other major cities have become important arenas of anti-incumbent mobilization even where the opposition has not captured municipal power. The opposition can use these municipalities as a stepping stone to national power, despite an uneven playing field, by delivering public services and social assistance to voters, training cadres experienced in governance, and recruiting popular mayors for high office. Yet local office is not a safe haven: Popular opposition mayors often become the first targets of judicial attacks by authoritarian governments precisely because they demonstrate a credible alternative to the incumbent. Thus, democracies will not defend themselves simply through local success stories. They will survive only if democratic actors rebuild the link between representation, material security, and everyday governance under conditions of socio-economic, technological, and geopolitical strain.