Fellows advise on how China, the West and emerging economies can best engage
On the final day participants rearranged themselves into three different groups, one of which formulated policy suggestions for China itself on engaging with the rest of the world, while the other two made recommendations for, respectively, Western countries and the rest of the world (especially other emerging economies), on how best to interact with China.
Their findings are summarized below.
China’s engagement with the rest of the world
International Norms and “Soft Power”
As an emerging power and responsible international actor in the world, China could promote the observance of international norms and values by embracing them in its own action, both domestic and international.
Up to now China’s style of domestic governance has often appeared to conflict with such globally accepted norms and values as responsibility, transparency and human rights.
If China’s Party-state wishes to convince the world that in fact it favors compliance with agreed international norms, this needs to be reflected in actual policies both at home and abroad.
Such policies could greatly increase Chinese “soft power” – something the country badly needs at a time when its economic and military strength is developing very rapidly.
International Security
It will be greatly to China’s advantage if it can make its conduct of international affairs less opaque and more predictable.
Transparency will help to reduce mistrust. It will be in China’s interest to engage in more robust strategies of building trust with other stakeholders, and to promote reciprocity in its interaction with them.
China may (in consultation with other stakeholders) build crisis management mechanisms to address specific issues and conflicts.
Such mechanisms may take the form of one or more non-binding fora for regular and emergency dialogue, with negotiated terms of reference, in order to maintain lines of communication between stakeholders even in the most tense of times.
China would also benefit from being more transparent in its decision-making processes.
Allowing outsiders to form a clearer understanding about the inner workings of the Chinese administration and systems would help alleviate unnecessary tension and suspicion among other stakeholders.
When dealing with sovereignty claims, China would greatly benefit from embracing a more transparent code of conduct, to encourage greater trust and confidence among other stakeholders.
This approach would further augment China’s participation in multilateral platforms and strengthen worldwide and regional belief in its commitment to resolve disputes through peaceful means – dialogues and consultations.
To strengthen this, it would be useful to have more effective communication at various levels among the civilian and military hierarchies of China and other stakeholders.
Non-Traditional Security (NTS)
China, like many other countries, faces a range of NTS issues such as transnational diseases, environmental degradation, air and water pollution, corruption, and many others.
These issues cannot be curbed or halted by traditional border-based control mechanisms.
Their cross-border nature requires international cooperation in efforts to mitigate them.
Therefore, China can deal with these issues more effectively by putting in place clearer and reliable mechanisms at home, and working more closely with international partners abroad.
On issues such as energy, China can provide leadership by actively promoting renewable and environment-friendly technologies, which will help to lessen energy pressures on China itself.
Economic Relations
China may consider adopting robust, resilient and transparent policies on trade, and on international frameworks for regulating both trade and financial markets.
The following suggestions may be considered:
Domestic Governance
Over the years abuses of power by local officials, and the level of public dissatisfaction these have provoked, have frequently been cited, both at home and abroad, as a major source of instability in China.
Bureaucratic hurdles, coupled with a lack of public input into decision-making, may thwart China’s efforts to achieve accountable and transparent local governance.
Therefore, local democracy at township or even county level needs to be introduced.
When a certain number of local officials are chosen by local citizens, the new local governance model will be able to establish an accountability system that requires all local government officials to answer for their conduct; more effective supervision of these officials both from above and from below; greater participation by local people; and a more effective system for managing public complaints.
Establishing an independent governance monitoring organization may help deal with these challenges, and contribute to meeting China’s need for more efficient and transparent governance.
Western countries interacting with China
Background considerations
As a rising global economic giant, China is less and less willing to listen to Western hectoring, lecturing, preaching or teaching. Nor is it receptive to attempts to integrate it into a ready-made world order.
Even talk of “advising” or “engaging” China, however well intentioned, risks being perceived as condescending.
The West must interact with China on a strictly equal footing.
Western countries, particularly the United States, the European Union and Japan, are involved in extensive security and trade activities in the regions around China, namely the South and East China Seas as well as South-East and Central Asia.
In recent years, China and the US have reacted to each other’s policies, with China taking a more assertive position while the US seeks to “re-balance” by strengthening its ties with other countries within the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing is suspicious of an increasing Western presence in its neighborhood and feels (or claims to feel) threatened when it sees its neighbors seeking increased Western support or cooperation.
Meanwhile, in Western capitals, as well as many within the region, there is a growing sentiment that China doesn’t want to converge with the West.
It is argued that China will become a less cooperative partner in the next ten years. And countries within the region fear that their interests may fall victim to confrontation caused by a lack of sufficient Chinese-Western dialogue.
The US, the EU, Japan and South Korea, despite their shared democratic values, have different interests in and around China, and therefore different concerns.
Some criticize China for taking actions which do not align with its words. But China itself has had a frustrating time dealing with Western partners, notably in its efforts to invest in the EU.
To some extent, China policy in all Western countries has been too much dominated by domestic politics.
Up to now China has not played a very active or leading role in most multilateral institutions. Including China in more multilateral institutions and processes may benefit both sides.
Obviously, multilateral engagement of this sort requires experience-sharing and close collaboration between the different Western parties involved.
In sketching a long-term strategic Western vision, it is crucial: to know what China’s priorities are; to recognize Chinese achievements; to consider possible trade-offs, particularly in the trade and investment area; to identify the challenges China currently faces and explore ways for the West to help; to understand where the pressures and outlets are; and, at the same time, to encourage China to understand the rest of the world more thoroughly.
Without this, Western initiatives are doomed to failure. Whatever the new policies, they must ultimately be acceptable to China.
Whether China wants to play a leading global role or not, it is already deeply engaged with countries all round the world in order to supply its domestic needs.
It has invested a lot around the world, mainly in energy and natural resources, but has little experience in managing and maintaining vulnerable supply lines, and has taken few measures to protect them.
Western countries do have this experience, and this is one area where cooperation between them and China could be fruitful.
Western nations must make an effort to understand China better
Unless the West expands and deepens its understanding of how China works – preferably with the help of a more transparent and open Chinese government, but this cannot be taken for granted – its views and advice, and indeed its efforts to help build Chinese capacity in specific sectors, stand little chance of being taken seriously.
In particular, the West needs to be cautious in its behavior towards China on security issues. While firm diplomacy may sometimes be needed, and current official dialogues must be continued, Western countries should seek to bring more transparency and reassure China about legitimate Western interests in the region through increased confidence building measures and targeted independent “track II” programs, i.e. those that involve practical exchanges among civil society groups, political parties, the judiciary, NGOs, academia and the private sector, as opposed to official government-to-government contacts. These programs should be aimed at building capacity, accountability and cultural understanding, with a focus on Chinese domestic priority concerns. Such programs can bring the internal Chinese debate to the West. (www.chinadialogue.net is a good example.)
These measures could take the form of short, medium and long-term initiatives, including track II cultural diplomacy and people-to-people programs – which would also allow China to exploit its “soft power”, in other words expand its influence abroad in a non-threatening way. Under such programs, Western scholars, as well as politicians, should make greater efforts to understand China, in particular the complexities of the ruling Communist Party and its procedures. This could happen through practical exchanges (with no official character), involving more research and interaction between independent Chinese and Western institutions, political parties, civil society and the private sector. This way, Chinese institutions, political parties and civil society groups would feel more integrated into the world system, and deploy their resources more effectively. There are already many such exchange programs under way at a variety of different official, semi-official and unofficial levels, involving (for instance) judges and students. It would be good to expand them in such a way that, for instance, Chinese journalists and bloggers would be permitted, and indeed encouraged, to spend time in the West.
It is important that track II initiatives acknowledge and complement the current official dialogues between the West and China, for example, on human rights. In the past ten years, the EU has been supporting local elections in China. If China moves in the direction of further democratization, this electoral assistance program could be expanded from local town level to county level, and widened to include assisting the agenda for political reform and encouraging smaller parties, which are already engaged in the consultative political process, to move towards actual power sharing.
For better interaction, it is important to increase familiarity with the English language inside China and familiarity with the Chinese language in Western countries.
Long-term strategic thinking on managing relations with China
A sine qua non of effective China policies is clearly to separate longer-term priorities and objectives from short-term domestic pressures that too often are incompatible with or directly contradict them.
This has been one of the biggest problems affecting Western governments’ efforts to pursue effective policies towards China, because it requires exceptional political firmness, vision and courage.
Western countries should:
Focus on having an articulated China policy and pursuing it in a coherent and sustained way that serves the West’s collective interest. This is especially needed in the EU, which should identify its priorities. The EU and its member states need to focus on long-term strategic engagement with China, particularly in their policies on investment issues, and on occasion be prepared to sacrifice short-term gains in the interests of this long-term goal. Above all, member states should stop undercutting Europe’s collective leverage by allowing Beijing to “buy them off” piecemeal with export orders and other commercial favors.
Pursue greater economic liberalization, primarily through positive incentives, while protecting legitimate national security interests, in compliance with the rules of the system.
Avoid subordinating Chinese policy to domestic politics.
Incorporate risk management in strategic planning: is the strategy flexible enough to adapt to swings in the political landscape within China – particularly if China suffers an economic crisis, and all our assumptions about China continuing to be the workshop of the world and a great market for our products fall to pieces; or if China’s rise turns out to have a nasty nationalistic side to it? Western policies (and, indeed, corporate strategies) towards China can no longer be based on straight-line extrapolation of past trends (e.g. unbroken double digit GDP growth, overriding emphasis on maintaining external stability, keeping a low profile in global affairs, etc.), as they have been for much of the past 30 years. The mounting challenges and uncertainties facing China make it prudent instead to adopt a “scenario planning” approach, explicitly recognizing that the country could go off in many different directions in the future.
How to achieve these long-term strategic objectives?
The West needs to pursue its objectives by way of inclusive multi-lateral and “pluri-lateral” approaches (the latter involving ad hoc groupings of countries as opposed to structured organizations), particularly on issues where we have common concerns such as international public goods. A concerted effort could be made to persuade China that a “divide and rule” approach to the West will not work, and that instead it should accept four-party talks on common interests with the EU, the US and Japan. If this got off the ground, smaller countries could later be brought into it as equal partners.
Rest of the world, especially other emerging economies interacting with China
Background considerations
There is an obvious asymmetry of power between China and all other emerging economies. Given the vast variety of countries and the conditions of their economies, available resources and existing relationships with China, it is important to note that the recommendations below should be adjusted to the specifics of individual cases. Some recommendations may be irrelevant to the specific conditions of some countries.
General issues and security
Economic issues
Social issues
The full report can be downloaded as a PDF here.